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WHY STILL PHILOSOPHY? – ONCE AGAIN*
Abstract: The intention of this paper is to revisit, once again the question as-
ked by Adorno and Habermas and other contemporary thinkers under different hea-
dings, few decades ago. The author is suggesting that nowadays philosophy requires
a final departure from the idea of having single and perennial face, and that this
would not only allow, but also enable philosophy to test its various faces freely, that
is, without norm or limit set in advance. At the same time, by creating such “liberal”
climate philosophy would no longer be frightened by the possible answer, and hence
would no longer dramatize the very question of “why still?”. Even if philosophy
turns out to be far less than the mission it once bestowed upon itself.
Key words: philosophy, critique, enlightenment, education, consumerist so-
ciety, cultural industry, school, teaching.
The title of this paper, as you know, is borrowed, and it is only
the “Once again” that saves it from a double impudence. The first
one being that such a broad, immense, crucial question is asked at
all, and that the author is making a claim, ambitious to the verge of
indecency, to offer a sort of answer. The second impudence is that af-
ter names such as Adorno and Habermas, as well as others under dif-
ferent headings, someone still dares to attempt this topic.
In 1962, Adorno posed the question “Why still philosophy?”
in a brief article with the same title. His diagnose is that philosophy
has established itself as a particular discipline that obeys the dictate
of specialist knowledge, and has renounced any distinct and genuine
substance it could claim as its own. By doing so, argues Adorno, phi-
losophy has announced its bankruptcy toward real social purposes.
Such transformation of philosophy is seen by the critical theorist, as
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* This paper was presented at The 2nd EPIC International Conference on Philo-
sophical Inquiry and Lifelong Learning “Talking Thinking: Philosophy and Dialogue
with children and adults”, held in Glasgow: 17–19 June, 2006. The paper was develo-
ped as part of the research project “Enlightenment in European, Regional and National
Context: History and Present” of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, fun-
ded by the Ministry of Science and Environmental Protection, Republic of Serbia.
its twilight. The philosophy has anaesthetized itself, it has deprived
itself of a critical cutting edge aimed at reality, has lost its function as
social corrective. Adorno believes that freedom and critique are at
the “very heart of philosophy” and that this is precisely what is lack-
ing in its contemporary form, as embodied in the schools of ontology
and positivism. “If philosophy is still necessary, as it has always
been – he wrote – it is as critique, as resistance to the expanding
heteronomy, be it in the form of a helpless attempt of the thought to
master itself and to expose imposed mythology”. Philosophy thus
defined, at that historical moment, does not want to add a new cri-
tique to the inconsolable chain of philosophy, but instead to an-
nounce a certain hint of hope that “un-freedom and subjugation will
not have the last word”. Paradox and resignation are the marks of
this thought, and they are readily accepted by it. The condition of
philosophy is such that, in order to think at all, it is necessary to think
a transformation of the world that thought sees as unchangeable. Un-
der these circumstances, argues Adorno, the power of resistance and
non-acceptance remains the only measure of philosophy today. This
requires from the philosopher to assume a particularly tragic stance:
to take it upon himself to conceptualize the satanic structure of the
world and to be aware, simultaneously, of the blindness of thought
itself and to self-consciously forfeit the projection of any positive al-
ternative. Adorno seems to hold that it is only in this way that other-
wise needless, dysfunctional, perhaps even impossible philosophy
might survive in these adverse times.
Nine years later, in 1971, as a response to Adorno’s text
Habermas writes his own Why still philosophy? Here, the last trace
of the heroic tragism disappears. Habermas has noticed that the para-
doxical figure of a totalizing self-critique of Reason accompanies
like a shadow every instance of great philosophizing since the end of
great philosophy, namely since Hegel. After the master-thinkers
with their grand and perennial philosophy, a type of philosophy rep-
resented by the more successful teachers and writers has appeared.
This sort of thought could understand philosophy only as critique.
Critical of its philosophical origins, of the traditional way of positing
the relation between theory and practice, of the demand for totality
of metaphysical knowledge and the religious interpretation of the
world, and finally, of the elitist self-understanding of philosophical
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tradition, philosophy runs the risk of robbing itself of any particular
content and, turning into an “empty exercise of self-reflection per-
formed on the objects of its own tradition, while being itself unable
to master any systematic thought”. This type of philosophy as de-
struction of thought, promoted by Nietzsche, and continued by
Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida, this philosophical style that is at-
tached to individual erudition and personal representation, this phi-
losophy understood as critique is withdrawing from the scene and,
according to Habermas, its new face is being announced: as
“non-scientistic philosophy of science”. For this philosophy the
question of “why still philosophy” would not be a question at all.
However, in both these cases, philosophy survives as one or
the other kind of critique. Its indispensable as well as socially desir-
able and beneficial place in the future still lies in the sphere of social
critique. Whether the critique be exercised relentlessly and desper-
ately from the perspective of a “critical utopia”, or in the less gener-
alized form of specific moves within immediate political confronta-
tion. Does the current condition of philosophy support such
diagnoses and prognoses given by Adorno and Habermas? It seems
that in spite of their hopes and their visions, the changes over the past
decades have given evidence of a transformation of philosophy’s
former face towards what these authors could not help but interpret
as its public, popular, profane, and farcical face. The survival of the
philosopher’s calling has become “mundane” to such extent that a
recall of the philosopher is more appropriate term. Philosophers no
longer recognize themselves even at places where their fledgling au-
dience recognizes them, quite suddenly and completely unexpect-
edly. Some years ago, in the USA, series of lectures were organized
on a set of practical-ethical evergreen issues (abortion, euthanasia,
capital punishment, business ethics, cloning, etc.). Instead of the ex-
pected several dozen, several hundreds of not very cheap tickets
were sold. This was the news, then. The news that, even for philoso-
phy, even today, there is interest.
Leaving aside for the moment what kind of philosophy – the
question is: who is interested? Maybe, we do not really want to know
the answer. No doubt, there is such a thing as popular philosophy, as
illustrated by the success of Jostein Gaarder with Sophie’s World, as
well as that of Jeanne Hersch, Luciano De Crescenzo and a longish
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succession of other authors with similarly fictionalized, adap-
ted-to-current-taste, impressionistic, patchworky and in all the neces-
sary ways applied histories of philosophy. As in any other matter,
here also we may find brilliant and gifted creations, as well as the
other sort. And both kinds seem to have their readers, quite a few of
them. Who, then, gets immersed in a philosophical ambiance on these
occasions, and what is this ambiance like? Do these lay readers wear
black sweaters and smoke pipes like in times when existentialism
was fashionable; do they have glowing eyes, full of devoted commit-
ment and anticipatory premonition like the phenomenologists? – Ac-
cording to my evidence, today even this fashionableness has gone.
What is more, one could argue that, in these readings, an overt
anti-philosophy is at work in the guise of philosophy.
You may not share my opinion, you may consider it too se-
vere, but I can’t help feeling that something unspeakably insulting
and frivolous is emerging here. For, philosophy – like literature,
from the same perspective – has become pure exoticism, pacified
and localized. Philosophical readings are now consumed in a vulgar
manner. An equally vulgar manner as it has become customary today
to go to the theatre in order to take a rest from daily concerns, in or-
der allegedly to reanimate the suffering soul and relax it by glutton-
ously nibbling at “sublime” topics it is otherwise deprived of. To put
it bluntly, for therapeutic purposes, and also for utilitarian ones – in
order for the owner of the soul to improve his resume. This is a prag-
matic, controlled escapism, directly at odds with the “cause” of phi-
losophy which has always refused relaxation, refuge, consolation,
playing the role of a social-care or a therapist. If anything, to philos-
ophy we can ascribe the desire, and a certain success, to stay non
pacified, to awake and provoke, to doubt and pester. To all of us who
have been raised on the stance of “vigilance against any absolute”,
on the imperative of persistent questioning, on splitting hairs, on un-
dermining, problematizing, irreducible inquisitiveness, hyper-criti-
cism, disputing up to the hilt, non-forgiveness, musings on every-
thing; raised on obligation to restlessness, to intellectual
devilishness, to bestial neurosis of curiosity and groundbreaking –
these “readings” appear not as philosophy’s new face, but as nothing
less than a treason, a shameful simulation of what philosophy used to
mean, what it has ever meant.
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All of a sudden and unawares, we have found ourselves in a
time that, unexpectedly and not following the philosophical proto-
col, has “surpassed” Hegel. In a time of explosive recognition and si-
multaneously termination of his – and generally theoretical – imper-
ative, at a time of non-dialectical obsolescence of critique,
proclaimed by Lyotard more loudly than by others: “Hegel did not
die of critique (on the contrary, he lives of it), he died in affluence, he
passed away of well-being, he perished of health”. All of a sudden
we have been left empty-handed since our only tradition has become
precisely the critique of any tradition: the anti-authoritarian stance
of the shrewd and all-penetrating gaze of the critical theorist. It is
easier to name those relevant authors who have not, than those innu-
merable ones who have in this vein spawned eulogies to Critique.
And then, we were surprised when the Critique itself was mannered,
fictionalized, sedimented, established, and made toothless, when –
emptied of normative contents – it grew into what Kant, not without
disparagement, called “the scholastic concept of philosophy”. So
nowadays, the only thing that remains is to teach philosophy – as
such, as a sort of lore – to students in schools.
Actually, it was precisely the institution in which Enlighten-
ment thinkers invested so much hope – that is, the school, in its mass
incarnation – that has disclosed all the limitations of the scholastic
concept of philosophy. For, philosophy has had the same destiny as
the idea of education, which, disfigured, got drowned in the world of
functionally administered and – by the Opium of consumption –
(dis)ideologized society. Once the pride, sublimation and criterion
of humanity, classical education has everywhere been ranking in-
sultingly low. Here I mean that sort of general, non-profitable educa-
tion, one that does not train for useful profession or a trade. Such ed-
ucation has become at best a rather unfortunate choice, among many
other more fortunate ones. Admittedly, ‘it still holds some prestige
for well-to-do wives of successful men, but otherwise it is reserved
for men who have failed in the market world’ (This is a quote from a
speech made by former Serbian Minister of Education.) Philosophy
in its own right is valued just as any other collector’s hobby, just as
much as to be asked, as Brodsky has: “Oh, you write poetry, that’s
nice; but how do you earn your living?” This outcome of the epopee
of philosophy could be interpreted as a satanic conspiracy of the un-
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thinking world, or as a just punishment for its presumptuous theoret-
ical projects, or simply as an indifferent course of a mini-history.
Probably no one harbours any illusion as to the impossibility of ap-
peasement, obsolescence and withering away of education, defined
in the old-fashioned way, and of withering away of the old ancient
art of philosophizing, along with other old and lately so unnecessary
trades.
The already socially controlled, and after the principles of po-
litical and economical power hierarchically organized, institutions
of knowledge – for example, Universities in the States – have been
ghettoized, located at campuses, equipped with all the necessary re-
quirements, but shielded from the eye and the ear of the public. It is
already in this “geographical” way that they are precluded from any
more serious intervention in the arena of public action, for which
they anyway lack internal strength or motive. Their erstwhile re-
spectable walls no longer inspire reverence in anyone, and they can
only serve as scenery for tourist guidebooks. In the same way as it
happened with all subversive movements, a sort of taming has taken
place of the entire institution of education: by cultural industry,
Hollywoodization, spectacularization, and, finally, by making it ac-
ceptable and benign through dosed legalization, through processing
and recycling in the consumerist machine. If the surrealists have ar-
rived into elementary-school readers, abstract expressionists into the
offices of business executives, Marx into economics textbooks and
Paul McCartney has become a ‘Sir’, then it is difficult to imagine
any oddity, challenge, or subversion that the market of ideas will not
digest and devalue. Powerlessness is general, not because of censor-
ship or the blunting of the critical edge, but because critique itself
has become ritualized. Adorno writes somewhere, thinking of Des-
cartes and Kant, that in earlier times philosophers were writing
toadying letters to the rulers, while at the same time in their works
subverting the absolute power of these. Nowadays, on the contrary,
one has casual lunches with statesmen; one can, moreover, tell them
all sorts of things, but their payroll is strictly respected.
And finally, let us not forget that within the educational insti-
tutions themselves there is something like an audience; true, a closed
one, which, thanks to compulsory attendance, has long been uncom-
mitted; it is not the erstwhile community of the learned and the less
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learned that will become more learned all together in shared devo-
tion to the Truth. Today, at school, you no longer have before you –
like Plato and Aristotle in their time – an intellectual audience pledg-
ing allegiance to philosophical education, but students who, to be
honest, are not voluntary listeners to your lectures. They are, to be
sure, “genuine philosophers” in terms of readiness to ask that char-
acteristic philosophical question of “why?”. I concede that I may be
speaking from the limited experience of the country I come from,
where philosophy is taught in the final year of secondary school. It is
up to you to believe me or not that, over there, the students start from
where philosophy has painfully arrived: they advance from a de-
structive questioning of the validity of philosophy. At that, their po-
sition is clearly pre-centered and articulated in the following way:
“What good is this to us?”. This is the question they ask not just in re-
gards to the subject of philosophy, and definitely not by way of a
philosophical exercise. They pose this question to the entire classical
education, to the entire idea of the Greek Paideia and the German
Bildung, to the entire non-narcissistic philosophical heritage,
de-centred from the functional ego, the heritage in which the history
of Enlightenment, as becoming human, has invested so much. We
might rightly argue that they have discarded this idea and this heri-
tage, under the authorization of the contemporary social construct or
the logic of capital or psychical convenience or value conformism or
whatever, without having ever reached them in the first place: but
does it make any difference? Does this challenge their right to con-
test? So, the frontline has doubled, and schizophrenia becomes inev-
itable. We, philosophy teachers, have found ourselves in a role we
did not have in mind when we were choosing our calling. We are lit-
erally stuck in a tragi-comical drama, playing no longer the hero –
for heroic times are long gone by – not even an anti-hero. Perhaps
most accurately put, we are playing a post-hero, worthy of some
compassion but not of sympathy, who barely manages to reformulate
the phrases that he knows have been invalidated for almost two cen-
turies by the self-awareness of the philosophical reflection on the
“misery of philosophy”; the phrases on sublimity and timelessness,
authenticity and universal meaningfulness of philosophical prob-
lems. To make things worse, we know that we must appear like
someone who in the classroom assumes the posture that we, more
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than other people, consider inappropriate and unbecoming; we
speak, inadvertently, in that solemn and didactic tone, our finger in
the air – in the absence of an officer’s baton. Even if in self-defense,
even if self-consciously, in any case we realize that, according to the
yardstick of an unsympathetic audience, we inevitably advance in an
aggressive, arrogant and patronizing manner.
It is difficult to suggest a definite exit strategy from the situa-
tion philosophy has found itself in, together with those who feel qual-
ified, or are called upon, to pass on and diffuse the philosophical lore.
In attempt to find a way out of the impasse, two strategies are used.
One is to turn philosophy into a museum piece or a relic from the past
(as to be a museum curator is quite nice job). The other is to “update”
philosophy all the way to treacherous banality and vulgarization (the
vigilant “know-it-all” also has his share of honors). At any rate, the
hostile world now passes judgments on philosophy, rather than vice
versa. It is philosophy that is nowadays asking for space and accom-
modation, adapting itself and striving to survive. It is problematic,
not in the manner it used to be, no longer by regenerating itself
through increasingly relentless self-criticism, but precisely in its very
texture, futile as it is, in that unproductive critical figure, in that
thematization whereby it is conclusively put on stake, asking no lon-
ger “why at all” but rather “why still”. Having said this, and bearing
in mind its one-time pretense and status, one could certainly claim
that philosophy is irretrievably on the defensive. The philosopher, as
well as the one who teaches and questions its heritage, would in this
constellation have to somehow remain loyal to philosophy, even after
having completed the critique and self-critique of philosophical
thought. He would have to ensure that the autonomous philosophical
challenge of philosophy does not get bogged down either in total ruin
and euphorically blinded subjection to outside powers, or in the char-
acteristic simulation of autarchy and haughty autism. In other words,
neither in the social functioning, nor in a proud existence on welfare.
It is only in such way tempered philosophical erudition that would be
capable of assembling the decanted, independently floating forms of
contemporary philosophy. The full range, from neuroepistemology to
deconstruction, and call upon them as witnesses to a current endeavor
to announce an uncertain, but not unpromising future out of the rich
tradition. This however would require a departure from the idea that
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philosophy has a single face – perennial, critical, scientific, whatever
– and allowing it to test its various faces freely, that is, without norm
or limit set in advance. Maybe the time has come to create such a cli-
mate, in which philosophy would itself no longer be frightened by the
possible answer, and hence would no longer dramatize the very ques-
tion of “why still?”. Even if philosophy turns out to be far less than
the mission it once bestowed upon itself. For, that less would by no
means be little.
Predrag Krstiæ
ÈEMU JOŠ FILOZOFIJA? – JOŠ JEDANPUT
Saetak
Namera ovog rada je da još jedanput iznova propita samo ono pitanje statusa
filozofije koje su unazad nekoliko decenija postavili Adorno i Habermas, kao i drugi
savremeni mislioci u drugaèijim formulacijama. Autor sugeriše da filozofija danas
potrebuje konaèni raskid sa idejom posedovanja jednog i perenijskog lika – što bi joj
ne samo dozvolilo, nego upravo i omoguæilo da, bez norme i granice postavljene
unapred, slobodno iskuša svoje razlièite likove. U isto vreme, stvaranjem ovakve
“liberalne” atmosfere u pogledu vlastitog odreðenja i samorazumevanja, ona više ne
bi bila zastrašena moguæim odgovorom, pa stoga više ne bi ni dramatizovala samo
pitanje “èemu još?”. Èak i ukoliko se posle vlastitog dovoðenja u pitanje ispostavi da
je njeno znaèenje mnogo manje nego ona misija koju je jednom sebi namenila.
Kljuène reèi: filozofija, kritika, prosvetiteljstvo, obrazovanje, konzumenta-
ristièko društvo, industrija kulture, škola, uèenje.
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